



A POLITICAL REVIEW OF 1951

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A POLITICAL REVIEW OF 1951

Originally written as part of Berlin's contribution to the 1952 *Britannica Book of the Year*, this lengthy treatment of political developments in 1951 was almost entirely excluded from the published text. The version that incorporates extensive corrections made by Berlin in the copy of most of the relevant parts of the typescript held in the Edward Weeks papers at the Harry Ransom Centre, The University of Texas at Austin (a small portion of the text exists only as an uncorrected carbon in the Berlin papers in Oxford). It seems that Berlin may have offered this material to Edward Weeks, editor of the *Atlantic Monthly*, but it was not published there. Thanks to Elizabeth L. Garver of the HRC for archival help, and to Michael Sevel for invaluable assistance in transcribing the Texas text.

The year 1951, while it is not marked by events which broke with or sharply deviated from tendencies perceptible in 1949 or 1950, possessed characteristics which might, to future historians, make it seem crucial; for in the course of it formidable major developments seemed to acquire clear and decisive form.

The post-war conflict between the two worlds – the Eastern and the Western – continued, indeed, with increased sharpness; but the arresting fact consisted in the conspicuous rapidity with which both were being consolidated. It seemed possible to discern the social, economic and political contours of human society in, at any rate, the second half of the twentieth century.

The grand lines were emerging into sharp relief. On the one hand, the USSR with its allies and satellites; on the other, Western Europe. On the one hand, the crumbling of the older types of imperialism in many diverse ways, rapid and slow, violent and peaceful, planned and chaotic; on the other, the rise of new forms of nationalism on the ruins of ancient feudal and colonial systems. On the one hand new forms of economic and social integration, gradually but surely superseding older forms of national economy, but still remaining within the framework of what can broadly be described as a capitalist system; on the other, forms of planning genuinely independent of, and opposed to, the social and political traditions of the West.

None of these phenomena proceeded purely from calmly conceived, rational plans pursued for the sake of their own intrinsic merits; but, as normally happens in the lives of both individuals and nations, they sprang from urgent necessities; a sense of immediate

danger, the interplay of many forces, conscious and unconscious, directed and accidental; and consequently had about them at the time of their creation an air of improvisation and, at times, of hurried and haphazard urgency – ad hoc attempts to stop sudden gaps at the last moment. Yet from the vantage-point of the remote historian of the future, they may well come to present a coherent pattern, and seem to proceed inescapably from the necessities of the times – so plain and immediate that it will be difficult to imagine how we, their contemporaries, could have been relatively so unaware of their ‘logic’ and inevitability, and in many cases of their obvious desirability, usefulness and virtue.

The world was no less disturbed than during the two preceding years. Again were fewer than twenty-one outbreaks of disorder,¹ accompanied by eighteen disputes.² But the scene was dominated by the major centres of violent conflict: the Korean war, the oil dispute in Persia, and the Egyptian attempts to expel the British from the Suez Canal (and to acquire full control of the Sudan); and, towering over this, the violent tension, now rising to a point where a final explosion seemed near, now falling to the level of ‘normal’ political crisis, between the Soviet sphere of influence and the loose congeries of Western nations.

Under the pressure of these events, both the great halves into which the world seemed divided began to acquire a discernible shape. The USSR continued with its policy of rearmament, and of diversion of all the resources which it could muster, both within its own territory and from that of its satellites, towards its programmes of vast armament and capital investment, leaving as little as possible for that minimum of consumers’ goods without which even the Soviet population could scarcely be expected to live or work.

¹ In Algeria, Argentina, Bechuanaland, Bolivia, British West Africa, Burma, Eritrea, Grenada (WI), Guatemala, Indo-China, Indonesia, on the Israel–Syrian border, in Malaya, Nepal, Nigeria, Persia, Panama, Siam, Spain, Tibet and on the Yugoslav–Bulgarian border.

² Antarctica, British Honduras, Cyprus, Ecuador–Peru, Israel–Jordan, Israel–Syria, Kashmir, Korea, Morocco, South Africa (British Protectorates), Sudan, Suez Canal, Trieste, Western New Guinea. [The total is fourteen, unless the three Protectorates in Southern Africa – Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Swaziland – are counted separately.]

The requisitions of the USSR from its western satellites became sharper than ever. While there was much talk in the satellite press of the growing economic strength of, for example, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Rumania under the new dispensation, what in fact seemed to be occurring, so far as Western observers could judge, was the imposition of a deliberate Soviet policy whereby these countries were made directly dependent upon the USSR for their raw materials and the financial and general economic machinery in terms of which their economies operated. No attempts were made to encourage anything like independent economic strength, or any degree of relative national freedom, in these countries; indeed, this was precisely the heresy which was denounced so harshly as Titoism, or bourgeois nationalism, or submission to the corrupt influence of Western warmongers. The carrying through of policies so rapid and so ruthless, as if in fear of imminent hostilities, leaving little time for a solidier and less painful transformation, naturally necessitated the imposition of a degree of political conformity upon nations used to submission, indeed, but not to the degree of physical and mental discipline practiced in a fully totalitarian country; and this was inevitably accompanied by an increase in the rate of trials and purges, at once as a practical measure for the elimination of elements regarded as even in a faint degree potentially unreliable; as an encouraging example to the rest of the population; and as a means of sharpening the revolutionary temper, the elan and zeal of Communist parties, exposed, as they were, scarcely less than the rest of the population, to economic hardships which were due largely to economic insulation from the West, and needing, as the only available antidote, injections of what seemed at times highly synthetic and artificially induced moral and political enthusiasm.

Ever since the USSR compelled its satellites to withdraw from the Marshall Plan Conference of 1947, it seemed plain that a decision had been taken to build a great insulated economic unity east of the Iron Curtain; this process was accelerated by wars and rumours of wars, and expanded over a far larger area by the de facto adhesion to it of China, whose programme of collectivisation of farms and rapid industrialisation of one of the greatest rural areas of the world was evidently making great strides, at the expense of a vast degree of human suffering not altogether unlike that which

accompanied similar experiments in the first decade of the Stalin regime within the USSR itself.

The intermeshing of the planned economies of the Communist states was, of course, not the result of either economic necessity or economic doctrine alone, but was a necessary corollary of the degree of political control which the dictatorship of the Communist Party entails in all the areas under its control. If the present rulers of the USSR were to make secure their own tenure of their present form of government, the one development which they could not afford to permit would be the emergence of independent or semi-independent forms of national life in territories under their influence; both because this would permit standards of living dangerously competing with their own, and because it might introduce an element of relative freedom into a system whose survival conspicuously depended upon the degree of tautness to which it could be screwed up.

Various motives were adduced by foreign observers to account for the continued trials for 'treason', in virtually all the 'satellite' countries, of clergymen, including Roman Catholics, Protestants, Jews and Muslims, as well as members of liberal professions, 'capitalists' of various types, and finally of members of Communist Parties accused of the now routine offences – nationalism, sabotage, spying for foreign powers, etc. But this seemed no more the normal accompaniment of the creation of tightly controlled quasi-Soviet systems, where a prime necessity of the party in power is to indicate to its subjects in an absolutely unmistakable fashion the differences between friend and foe. Members of Churches were punished as such; so were members of economic classes due to be liquidated; so were representatives of unfriendly powers, such as the Americans Vogeler (a businessman) in Hungary and Oatis (a newspaper correspondent) in Czechoslovakia; so were members of the dominant Party who showed signs of trying to think or argue for themselves, or belonged to some section of the population regarded as generally suspicious, or had gone too far in opposing the faction which the Kremlin had decided to back at the moment (this may account for the sudden elimination of, for example, Rudolf Slánský, hitherto Moscow's very trusted friend, in Czechoslovakia. The 'deviations' of the former foreign minister Clementis, and of the smaller fry removed with him, seemed easier to interpret).

A rigorously planned Eastern European economic system with its centre in Moscow, and tied by somewhat looser, but nevertheless strong, lines to the semi-independent Communist republic of China, was being rapidly brought into being. The tempo with which this was attempted, and the crudity and simplicity of the design with which alone so vast an undertaking could be carried through, effectively killed such lingering forms of individual self-expression as may have survived in the countries in question through the violent transformations of the late 1940s.

The work of sovietisation appears to have proceeded both in Slav and non-Slav countries (such as Romania, Hungary and Albania) a good deal more successfully than the analogous Russification policy once so unsuccessfully practised by the tsars. Numerically fewer efforts at independence seem to require suppression: the memories of the past were being stamped out very methodically; the monolithic system in 1951 made great and obvious strides forward in creating a world within a world, blind and deaf to human activity beyond its confines. Finland alone appeared licensed to occupy a unique position as a semi-independent, semi-client power still conducting its own form of life, and refusing to adopt Communist forms, while retaining a cautious and respectful attitude towards its all-powerful neighbour.

But at the same time, and perhaps in half-conscious reaction to this gigantic process of system-building, Western Europe, for all its diversity of historical, racial and national traditions, seemed gradually, and in an unsystematic fashion, yet quite unmistakably, to be growing into a new pattern also. The number of governmental and semi-governmental instruments engaged in this process was very great and, to the layman, highly confusing. The social, economic, political and security agencies, some confined to Europe, some embracing the Atlantic Community; some organs of the United Nations, some arising out of specific multilateral treaty agreements between Western powers; some executive, others merely advisory; some representing governments, others parliaments and national assemblies – all these covered Western Europe with an apparently chaotic network of interlacing and often conflicting authorities, whose functions only those who belonged to them, or set them up (and perhaps not always even they), appeared fully to understand.

Nevertheless, out of this welter of NATO and ECA and ECU and OEEC and SHAPE; the Committee of Foreign Ministers and of the Deputy Foreign Ministers the Council of Europe, or of the Brussels Treaty Powers; the Harriman Committee or the Pearson Subcommittee or the many overlapping conferences on tariffs or raw materials or South East Asia or trade; out of this vast ill-coordinated amalgam of activities, resembling nothing so much as the Washington administration during the war years of 1941–6, a genuine supernational structure was growing. There had been much talk by various voluntary associations both before and after the Second World War about the necessity of abolishing national frontiers and creating genuinely federal units of great size comparable to the USSR and the US. Some wanted this for all the peoples of the world; others only for the Atlantic nations; some spoke of the possibility of a Scandinavian or North European Federation, others only of countries which had formed part of one or other earlier Roman or medieval unity.

These voluntary associations were apt to be treated as worthy but impractical and, at best, harmless enthusiasts, unaware of the desperate realities of the European scene, of the economic jealousies and national hatreds, of the incompatibilities of temperament and tradition. Nevertheless, in its often naive and absurdly oversimplifying way this kind of talk was symptomatic of a genuine and powerful trend. European integration was genuinely on the way; a new Europe was emerging.

In the great argument as to whether unification should take a direct political form of federation (as in the British North American colonies in the eighteenth century), or a functional form of creating international control of industries and goods and services, the latter possibility captured the imagination of European statesmen; and, in the year in question, led to spectacular results. The so-called Schuman Plan – to set up the ‘European Coal and Steel Community’ – now virtually accepted by France, Western Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, for the control by these countries of the most powerful iron and steel area (and one of the most powerful coal areas) in the world under the High Authority composed of the representatives, but largely independent, of the constituent countries, is an instrument of international power likely to be more effective than any arrangement since the medieval unity

of these countries – forming as they do almost precisely the territories which constituted Charlemagne's empire.

The British government adopted an ambiguous attitude towards this arrangement. On the one hand, it approved its general aims and promised full cooperation; on the other hand, it adhered to its belief that as the centre of three intersecting systems – Western Europe, the British Commonwealth and the English-speaking world – it could not afford to allow its national policies to submit to the interests of a body not connected with its non-European commitments. At the back of the minds of British statesmen, there appeared to linger the seldom advanced but persistent conviction that any integration of the British system into an European arrangement depriving the British Parliament of full control would inevitably lead to grave lowering of the standard of living in the British Isles caused by the incursion of the competitive and non-complementary economies of Europe; and while this consideration obviously was present most vividly to the minds of the Socialist government which reigned in Britain until the last months of the year, it exercises an influence scarcely smaller upon those very Conservatives who, when they spoke a year ago at Strasbourg at the Council of Europe, displayed a greater eagerness for such association than their responsibilities, when they succeeded to power, turned out to permit.

Nevertheless, the process in Europe itself continued. The so-called Pleven Plan for the creation of a European army was another powerful factor in the creation of a genuine transnational Western European community; it was fraught with every difficulty. The possibility of a powerful West German army frightened the French no less than the Russians; the prospect of economic domination by the resurgent Germans, to all appearances infinitely less exhausted than their conquerors (at any rate in Europe), and with an ebullient energy and efficiency in reconstructing their broken economy paralleled scarcely anywhere else, was also a nightmare to sections of opinion both in Britain and in France.

The perpetual US insistence upon a greater degree of European integration, both as an end politically good in itself, and as alone making feasible that copious river of military and economic aid which the US had set itself to provide so effectively, while it caused irritated reactions among Europeans not prepared for what seemed to them tantamount to sacrificing national forms of life in return for

what some regarded as economic domination by the American Colossus (together with what such persons considered to be an imminent prospect of war brought on by the very determination of the US to rearm its allies), nevertheless, in its turn, assisted towards the destruction of national barriers. The old League of Nations had indeed been a far more clearly designed juridical institution, and its committees and subcommittees formed a symmetrical system, lucid and intelligible as the palimpsest of the new criss-crossing authorities and agencies hardly was. Nevertheless, the League of Nations, despite its services to mankind, was ultimately a hortatory body which the first serious crisis of conflicting power progressively perplexed, humiliated and destroyed. And had its successors in the period of the Second World War confined themselves to the mild and orderly activities of the old League, the result might have been equally ineffective. But whether because of the growth of the Russian danger and a yearning for effective collective security; or because Hitler brutally and wastefully, and for evil motives, had nevertheless quite clearly weakened the concept of nationality in Europe, much as Napoleon had destroyed that of dynasties; or because technological advances and economic organisation had come to dominate political forms so openly that the older political arrangements not merely proved inadequate but were finally recognised to be so, even by the most obtuse and obstinate conservatives; for whatever reason, on the continent of Europe national barriers were visibly crumbling. The North Atlantic Alliance, stretching across Western Europe to Greece and Turkey; the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan, created largely under the impulsion of the genius of M. Jean Monnet, the most imaginative technocrat of our day; the presence of General Eisenhower in Europe as a token of the serious nature of US intentions; the cluster of economic bodies which derived their life and sustenance from the reality of the weapons and the material aid with which in fact the US supplied its allies (and with which they had begun, to an increasing extent, to supply themselves) – this projection of Mr F. D. Roosevelt's Washington on to the European scene had, in fact, created a going concern: an actual economic organism, still largely shapeless and inefficient, but nevertheless a functioning system whose importance in destroying the national boundaries of the states of the Western European continent emerged into the full light of day during the course of 1951.

The climax occurred on 18 April with the solemn signing of the instrument of the coal and steel authority by the governments of the six nations.³ The sovereign assemblies of all these countries had not ratified this instrument by the close of the year, but this is unlikely to fail of accomplishment; nor did it seem likely that the most passionate wooing would induce any British government in the near future to commit either a large portion of its economic future or the defence of the British Isles to bodies over which it did not retain control; but it promised to approach this ideal as nearly as it could without irrevocably committing itself, and with this the European powers, not altogether happily, agreed to rest satisfied.

The mere emergence of this great new factor in European affairs is in itself perhaps a sufficient indication of the great change of mood from, for example, 1949. Then, cynicism and despondency were deep and widespread in Western Europe. Spokesman after spokesman hastened to assure the US that in the event of a new invasion from the East, nothing could induce the exhausted casualties of the last cataclysm to lift a finger in their own or anybody else's defence. This mood, compounded of terror, exhaustion and inner weakness, together with a genuine antipathy to and fear of the two great giants of the East and West, began to yield in 1950 to a realisation that war was not inevitable, nor the resources of the West, whether moral or material, so negligible as at one time they may have seemed. 'Neutralism' was not, indeed, by any means dead, particularly in France and Italy. Nevertheless, the localisation of the Korean war, and of the Persian and of the Egyptian crises; the relative economic revival of the Western European continent; and, above all, the opening of new vistas which the new economic plan, backed by persistent American advice, complaint and exhortation (and, most of all, American weapons and economic resources), transformed the scene.

The danger of a general war at the end of 1951 seemed remoter than for many months, and while resentment of dictation by the US, which as often as not takes the form of a vaunting or partly real and partly imaginary cultural superiority to American civilisation, continues in Paris and in Rome and even in Bonn and Vienna, nevertheless the Marshall Plan and its successors were among the

³ France, Western Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg.

few human experiments which had plainly justified themselves, despite all the violent pessimism and scepticism in Europe in 1947 amid which they were launched, in that they succeeded in inaugurating a movement whose full consequences are scarcely foreseeable. Its immediate result was the averting of a major slump in the European economy, the revitalisation of the economies of the European continent, and the stimulation of a trend which cannot but alter the frontiers, the occupations and indeed the outlook of the vast majority of the inhabitants of Western Europe. And this became fully plain only in the course of the notable year 1951.

Lest, however, these words suggest too positive a view of the achievement of the Western world in 1951, it is as well to juxtapose them with the wars and risings in the East with which it was faced during this period. Everything which was done occurred against a background of the Korean war; and the history of it is the story of the containment of one world by another, along the outer borders of both.

The end of 1950 saw a temporary reversal of US arms and led to a moment of genuine terror for those who feared (as did many European observers, and some US observers) that humiliated American pride, if nothing else, would sooner or later force the US into a vast aggressive operation against the Chinese mainland, and thereby unloose the Third World War. These fears, as the voices of the more sober students of American policy and temperament had steadily maintained, proved ungrounded; the armies of the United Nations – in effect, an American force with its allies – recouped its losses; the North Koreans, and subsequently their Chinese allies also, were driven back. But General MacArthur, who had sustained much criticism on account of his reported refusal to allow for the possibility of Chinese intervention, appeared to claim, even at the moment of his lowest military fortunes, that he had indeed won the original or Korean war, and that the entrance of the Chinese had precipitated a new Chinese war for which a very different strategy would be required. There were press reports that he believed that the US was engaged in a general crusade against Communism, that Communism was indivisible, that to localise or confine a war was impracticable, that the US would merely exhaust itself unnecessarily by restraining its operations to the Korean peninsula, that the enemy must be attacked in his own lair; in short, that a war against China and if need be the USSR was both inevitable and morally necessary.

Early in the year, President Truman, without impugning General MacArthur, denied any such intention on his own part; declared in the full hearing of the world that his country was engaged upon maintaining the authority of the United Nations, and that he had no intention of converting war into an attack upon any great power as such (for example, by bombing Manchurian installations); that while General MacArthur had indeed full authority from the United Nations to go beyond the 38th Parallel which was the frontier between the old territories of North and South Korea, this was to be no more than a means to uphold that body's decision. The US Government made it clear that, unlike Britain, they had no intention of recognising Communist China; no intention of abandoning the Chinese Nationalists on the island of Formosa; and every intention of pursuing the Korean war to the bitter end.

The Conference of Imperial Prime Ministers which met in London was obviously worried by the progress of this war, and, largely under the influence, it was reported, of Mr Nehru, the Prime Minister of India (who, while not pro-Soviet, was thought to feel certain sympathies with the position of any Asiatic nation which asserted its independence), expressed a general hope that some understanding might be reached both with Communist China and the USSR by means of peaceful discussion; some supporters of the Labour Government in England saw Mr Attlee as the mediator who, by his timely flight to Washington, saved the world from major disaster; and pressed the role of Britain as mediator between what they regarded as a violently resentful Soviet power and irresponsible and ill-informed American imperialists.

The USSR denounced the Western powers, but particularly the US, as heartless murderers and ruthless capitalist exploiters and aggressors. In the spring, General MacArthur wrote a letter to the Majority Leader of the US House of Representatives in which he expressed open criticism of what seemed to him the insufficiently rigorous policies of the US administration. The letter made it plain that General MacArthur believed in the bombing of Manchuria – at any rate, in some form of violent offensive against the Chinese, as well as the North Koreans, greater than any hitherto authorised or contemplated.

Two days after the publication of this letter, on 11 April, President Truman relieved the General of his command, amid a gasp of mingled surprise, relief and indignation from the general

public and the opponents and advocates of the General's policies. The President's courage in dispensing with the services of a general of such prestige and panache as MacArthur appeared to extort the admiration even of some of who regarded his action as unjust or mistaken. This act had consequences very different in the US from those which it had in Europe. On the latter continent, it was widely approved: General MacArthur was to many Europeans a symbol of the aggressive American war spirit, which lent itself to those who wanted to represent American policy as being guided by naked self-interest or national arrogance or a mixture of barbarous folly and barbarous strength. General MacArthur as a bogey was one of the most powerful weapons in the hands of both the Communists and the 'neutralists'; a scarecrow with which to frighten all those who shrank before the prospect of another war, a pointless 'atomisation' of innocent civilians in Europe. His recall therefore was the clearest possible indication that the US was not wildly bent on aggressive war, but was controlled by men – President Truman, or the Secretary of State, Mr Acheson, or Generals Bradley and Marshall – who literally meant what they said, and desired only to support the authority of the United Nations and not a world crusade.

To this degree, President Truman's action raised the prestige of America in Europe, and weakened the resistance to those political and economic measures of which America was the strongest sponsor, and which were endangered by suspicions of its good intentions. General Ridgway succeeded General MacArthur, and the Korean war, slowly and painfully indeed, developed more favourably for the Western allies. Chinese, Russians and Koreans began to speak of the possibilities of ceasefire arrangements or a temporary armistice. The Soviet representative at UNO, Mr Malik, indicated as much in his UN speech on 23 June. Soviet obstinacy, mutual suspicion, American refusal to concede to Chinese conditions – admission to the UN and the abandonment of Formosa – caused negotiations for such a truce to drag on fruitlessly during the rest of the year, accompanied by an alternation of ebb and flow in the actual fighting, which sometimes rose to almost its 1950 level of violence (North Korean–Chinese losses rose to over a million against a reported 103,000 of the Allied Forces), and sometimes declined to a virtual stalemate.

This situation was still in existence when the year ended, the truce negotiations still wearily continuing amid charges and counter-

charges of bad faith, sabotage, unprovoked attack, etc. Yet, despite almost daily losses in men and materiel, the Korean war began to move out of the centre of focus not only of the European, but even of the American, consciousness as well. It became a localised war, with no great triumphs or defeats hoped for or feared. The US had proved that its nerves were stronger than its enemies had anticipated, and that it was capable of carrying through a long containing action with the same perseverance and moderation and efficiency as that with which the British had so long contained the frontiers of their Empire against the raids of tribesmen and the more violent attacks of small but exasperated independent neighbours.

General MacArthur was recalled on 11 April, and arrived in San Francisco on 17 April. From the moment of his arrival, his procession through the US was a triumphal tour. Cities, states, legislatures vied in paying him homage. The Republican section of Congress succeeded in causing him to be invited to address both Houses of Congress on his return, and he did so – in a speech which even his opponents were compelled to describe as a masterpiece of political skill. He denounced the shortcomings of the US Administration, and swiftly became the focal point around which gathered all those who, from widely separated points of view, felt inimical to the policies or persons of the government of the US. The nucleus of his followers appeared to be composed of those ex-isolationists who were still dominated by fear and distrust of Europe, looked upon the foreign policy of the US as dominated by persons anxious, for one reason or another, to appease the USSR or to view its policies in too rosy a light.

General Chiang Kai-Shek was represented as the only real anti-Communist champion in Asia, betrayed and abused by those blind or politically subversive agents of the US who had so fatally preferred to lean upon his left-wing enemies; General MacArthur was represented as a man not merely of military genius but of wisdom and far-sighted patriotism, recalled solely because he had had the moral courage to denounce the suicidal policies of the President and his incompetent administration.

How far the champions of General Chiang really cared about his person or prospects was not always clear. What did emerge was that the failure of the administration in its China policy was still the outstanding stick with which its opponents could continue to beat it, and that the State Department, which for many years had been

regarded as the stiffest and most invulnerable of government agencies, had, as a result of the inevitable task placed upon it of dealing with the ideologies as well as personalities of foreign countries, rendered itself noxious to attacks of partiality, bias and even serious treason to the best interests of the US. Without the moderating influence of Senator Arthur Vandenberg (who died in the course of the year), who had been one of the architects of the bipartisan foreign policy at the end of Mr Roosevelt's last administration, the moderate Republicans appeared unable to restrain the zeal of Senator McCarthy, who was allied to Senator McCarran in common distrust of and opposition to the administration's views on foreign policy, foreign doctrine and foreigners in general.

Mr Roosevelt's memory, anything but obsolete after the inevitable shadow cast upon the liberal policies of that regime by the Hiss case (Mr Hiss, an ex-official of the State Department, accused of passing information to the USSR, and incarcerated for perjury, had begun to serve his prison sentence in the course of the year), had further light cast upon it by the publication of the diaries of the late Secretary of Defense, Mr Forrestal, in a book by the ex-Under-Secretary of State Mr Sumner Welles on Mr Roosevelt's most fateful decisions; and most of all by the publication of Mr George Cannon's lectures on US foreign policy, in which the thesis was argued with brilliance and profound feeling by this distinguished diplomat and Russian expert that American foreign policy suffered from misplaced idealism, by the irruption of democratic methods into fields where only experts could be permitted to tread, and by a haphazard and casual manner of reaching decisions under the stress of moral sentiment and internal political exigencies which bedevilled the rest of the world and damaged the reputation of the US among the very populations which in a missionary spirit it sought to rescue from their own shortcomings. He advocated a return to the balance of power and warned the US against wishing to foist its own somewhat callow ideals upon nations with very different traditions, habits and ambitions. This distrust of previous US policy and plea for the experts and professionals precisely contradicted the violent appeals to the moral sense of the American people against corrupt and treacherous diplomats made by the more unbridled representatives of the reactionary opposition.

Senator McCarthy seized upon errors in policy with regard to China which the Department of State had to some degree admitted, as the most promising terrain for conducting his disruptive operations. He made wholesale charges against a large variety of individuals, and so the McCarran Committee, charged with the inner security of the US, proceeded to investigate and cross-examine a number of persons thus accused. At least three officials of the State Department temporarily lost their posts as a result of this concentrated fire upon their persons and records. These were defended not only by the liberal press, which pronounced the charges false and the committee heavily biased, but by persons who had opposed the policy of the officials in question in the past, but regarded them as personally honest and the charges made against their personal integrity as reckless and unjust.

No conclusive evidence appeared to confute either the accusers or the accused but the air was thick with violent recrimination. It was not clear whether the Republican Party would regard Senator McCarthy as a valuable ally against the administration or, in view of the manner and matter of his denunciations, as a political liability rather than an asset. A group of liberal Republicans attacked his methods; but Senator Taft aligned himself with him. He seemed to be viewed by the average American as a demagogue guilty of much exaggeration and reckless talk, yet nevertheless the uncoverer of genuine of subversive activity in the nerve centres of national life.

When, however, Senator McCarthy went so far as to accuse General Marshall himself of having in effect made common cause with Stalin during and after his China mission, he seemed to go too far even for those who were ready to make maximum political capital out of any well-delivered attack on the Democratic administration, and somewhat discredited the anti-administration campaign. But besides its effect on Republicans or other bitter opponents of the party in power, the arrival of General MacArthur appeared to release a great deal of popular feeling long pent up against the administration for reasons very remote from foreign policy. The Democratic Party had been in power continuously for almost two decades. The acute frustration which this in itself had created suddenly burst through its dams, and in the distinguished and picturesque figure of the great soldier it found a hero homage to whom was in itself an act of protest – an expression of the many real and imaginary grievances against Mr Truman's regime.

Moreover, the undeniably romantic air of the General stood out as a patch of bright and brilliant colour in what had for too long been a procession of drab events in a country addicted to dramatic events and a heightening of the emotions. General MacArthur found among his allies such quasi-isolationists as ex-President Hoover, who urged, as he often had before, that ground troops, at any rate, should on no account be sent to Europe; that Europeans, at any rate, could or at least should be in a position to defend themselves without a perpetual drain on American lives and treasury. This was, to some degree, echoed also by Senator Taft, who was known to have presidential ambitions. General MacArthur did not, it is true, support this point of view: indeed, he made it clear that he favoured every means of stopping Soviet expansion, and was in favour of an aggressive policy of resistance, not of isolation; nevertheless, he was the natural hero and champion round whom the anti-Truman front could crystallise.

The swift conquest of China by the Communists lent plausibility to the view that the US administration had been guilty of the double crime of first letting itself be hoodwinked by Communists posing as mild agrarian radicals, and then, when it was too late, offering inadequate aid to the unfortunate Chiang. Chiang, indeed, became almost a Republican hero, and one or two Senators travelling abroad made a point of visiting him and identifying themselves with his grievances and his claims. European countries, especially those in any case only too prone to look on the US as emotionally unstable, and in the grip of mounting war fever, needed only to point to the cult of MacArthur as evidence for their diagnosis. Conversely, those in the US who favoured MacArthur found in this European attitude fresh evidence for the old thesis that the countries of Europe were ungrateful, corrupt, and either too cynical or too frightened to resist Communist penetration, and in any case not capable of being successfully defended by US arms which they did not have the spirit to use, and perhaps not worth defending by a morally upright, strong, young republic anxious to defend the enemies of all that had made it great.

Presently the administration struck back. Congress examined witnesses to discuss the Far Eastern policy and uncover the causes of General MacArthur's dismissal. Mr Acheson presented the administration's case with an impressive thoroughness, sincerity and skill. But the tide turned only when the military men began to testify

to their belief in the disastrous consequences of MacArthur's policies; the Secretary of Defense, General Marshall, and the Chief of Staff, General Bradley, and General Collins, finally placed their immense authority in the scale against the great recalcitrant; they denounced the policy of defensive war against the USSR, which they conceived that MacArthur's plan would have made inevitable, and for which by implication he stood. The situation was highly paradoxical: the bulk of General MacArthur's followers came from those who were opposed to foreign entanglements and who suspected the administration of carrying on the late President Roosevelt's, to them excessively warlike, policies. Yet this was what the general himself in some sense appeared to stand for. He declared that he had no political ambitions and that made him a figure to be set in sharp contrast with scheming and unscrupulous politicians. He denounced the present conduct of the Korean War, and that his Republican followers approved; he was the symbol of war against Communism, and that attracted to his side anti-Communists of all shades and such powerful organisations as the American Legion and the Roman Catholic Church. Yet in some sense he was understood to favour aggressive warfare; and that confused at any rate some of his potential supporters. Moreover, the immense moral weight of such men as Marshall and Bradley disposed of the image of MacArthur as being opposed only by politicians and left-wing intellectuals; and so, in the end, as the year wore on, this episode receded into the background.

The Korean War had not been lost; and it looked as if a general war had, perhaps, been averted. The great armament orders had prevented such possible economic recession in the US as might have caused international melees, prices were rising, and so to some extent were wages. Strikes occurred, but none of them too lengthy or crippling to industry; there was great prosperity in the land, greater perhaps than at any previous period; there was a good deal of political discontent, much suspicion, some of it evidently justified, of corruption due, it was thought by some, to the retention of power for too many years in the hands of the same interests. Senator Kefauver conducted an effective campaign designed to expose sinister collusion between politicians, police and racketeers of various brands. Government agencies in Washington were systematically exposed as harbouring men who behaved, if not always in a corrupt, yet often in a highly incorrect and disreputable,

manner. Mr Truman's administration lost prestige thereby; its efforts to purify public life were held at times to be less energetic than they might have been because of the President's too passionate sense of personal loyalty to his old friends, some of them considered unfit for the offices they held.

Republicans and some Democrats attacked Washington as a sink of shocking corruption; the President defended his administration and denounced its opponents; the mood, excited and disturbed, did not, however, contain that mixture of fear and despair in which strong men are raised to power by great waves of popular feeling. The US was too prosperous for Boulangism of this kind.***

Attacks on the policies of China were naturally connected with the continuation of attacks upon various persons active in Mr Roosevelt's New Deal, on the ground of their Communist sympathies and general unsoundness, and nests of them were being perpetually discovered in universities and other haunts of intellectuals. Nevertheless, the witch-hunt of last year seemed to be ebbing. The Regents of the University of California amended their decision about the loyalty oath, which caused the resignations of many members of the faculty; the champions of academic freedom appeared to be growing in strength. To foreign and indeed US observers, it did not appear as if freedom of conscience was altogether secure in the US; nevertheless, a reaction had set in, and was continuing against the indiscriminate attacks upon non-conformity of the previous year. The great universities of the East Coast had held out against the storm.

The production of weapons, aeroplanes, tanks and the like under Mr C. E. Wilson had not, indeed, reached those peaks which he and the President had foretold in a sanguine moment. On the other hand, consumer goods – cars and washing machines, refrigerators and television sets – had poured out with a prodigality never before seen in the history of the world. Food and clothing were produced in prodigious abundance; the backbone of the country – the farmers, the industrial workers, the middle classes – were not dissatisfied. Inflation had been partially checked. The financial scandals caused excitement, disgust and indignation, but not the ferocious sense of injustice which leads to the upsetting of the normal framework of political democracy. The presidential election year 1952 was approaching; Senator Taft was clearly to be a Republican candidate, the strongest representative of its

conservative core. The 'liberal' Republicans, led by Senators Lodge and Duff, had chosen Senator Eisenhower as their candidate: Mr Truman declined to say whether he would offer himself for re-election, and praised the liberal governor of Illinois, Mr Adlai Stevenson. Senator Kefauver, a democrat, entered his candidacy: there was talk of General MacArthur, of Chief Justice Vinson, of Governor Warren of California. Mr Dewey supported Eisenhower. Mr Stassen spoke in his own cause. The presidential issue began to loom larger than that of war and peace; the underlying assumption that a major conflict was imminent, which began to melt in 1950, vanished. The hoarders of goods who had banked upon an imminent war found themselves foolishly overstocked with goods; the great stores lowered their prices in precipitous competition with each other, to the astonished gratification of the general public. The only serious clouds to be observed darkened foreign skies.

The two outstanding problems of the year were the troubles in the Middle East and of Germany. The Muslim countries of the Middle East still presented an almost ideal example of the orthodox Marxist model of countries on the eve of revolution. One regime was dying, another was still waiting to be born. New economic enterprise had begun to break the ancient semi-feudal order in Persia, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and other Arab lands. Everywhere the same, situation seemed to prevail: a rich, corrupt, astute, traditionally semi-feudal ruling caste; a depressed, illiterate and largely starving peasantry; and between these a nascent middle class, merchants, factory owners, manufacturers of various types, and members of liberal professions, some risen from below, some emancipated from above, but for the most part frustrated for lack of opportunity to develop their skills, or live the kind of life of which their knowledge of more advanced civilisations had made them acutely aware. The dissatisfaction of this frustrated middle section of the population poured itself into both Communist and nationalist channels; and, if allowed to fester uncontrolled, might well overthrow the obsolete regimes of the pashas and their equivalents, with their ramshackle temporary alliances with this or that centre of power – the army or the religious leaders – much as they had done in the Balkans and indeed in Russia herself.

The USSR did not need to do very much beyond general encouragement of this natural process – both nationalism and Communism were natural centres of xenophobia and resistance to

the West, much exacerbated by the triumph of the state of Israel, which embodied sophisticated, alien, Western ways of life and was a symbol of a humiliating defeat of the backward Arabs in the hands of scientifically trained Jews supported by American and other Western countries.

This wounded and bitterly resentful nationalism boiled over in Persia in the course of the year, when a Muslim fanatic assassinated the Premier, General Razmara, on 7 March, in the name of national independence. Nationalist agitation took the form of demands for the nationalisation of the oil which is Persia's chief economic resource; its control by the Anglo-Iranian Company was the bitterest stigma of national degradation and exploitation. After a brief interlude under a pro-Western premier, accompanied by somewhat unimaginative compromises by the oil company, behind which the British government was known to be arrayed, an ultra-nationalist politician, Dr Mossadegh, took office as Prime Minister.

Dr Mossadegh was a picturesque figure who almost at once captured the half-amused imagination of the world public. He was (and is) a rich landowner of aristocratic birth, liable to weep uncontrollably at every emotional crisis; courteous, high-strung, shrewd, and exceedingly tough, Dr Mossadegh presently declared his life to be in danger from Muslim bigots, for whom even he was not fanatical enough; and reclining in a bed in the sanctuary provided by a room in the Persian parliament, he declared himself unalterably opposed to any concessions to the oil company. The oil was Persia's birthright: she must possess and control it all.

The British government took some time to realise with whom it was dealing. During previous disputes, satisfactory compromises had as a rule been reached. The British government laid its case before the Hague International Court, which issued an injunction freezing the status quo. The Persians denounced the Court, declined to be bound by its jurisdiction, and refused to retreat before the British threat to move out, bag and baggage, with their experts and their tankers, leaving the greatest oil refining industry in the world to be managed by the incompetent natives of Iran.

The US did its best to mediate between Persia and Britain. The case, it was thought in Washington, had not been too competently handled during Mr Bevin's illness, and Mr Morrison, who succeeded him as Foreign Secretary in March, did not seem to conduct it any better. Mr Harriman was sent by President Truman to Tehran to

mediate; Mr Richard Stokes, the British Lord Privy Seal, was sent at the head of a British mission to negotiate with the Persian government. Concessions were made by the British, condominium was offered, and then further concessions. Dr Mossadegh wept, fainted, but remained adamant, and was, at regular intervals, cheered violently by great throngs of his countrymen who felt the day of liberty was at last dawning. Dr Mossadegh appeared at Lake Success to lay his case before the Security Council. The Anglo-Persian dispute was duly adjourned. The US declined economic help to a country so perversely intent upon damaging the interests of the West; nor was it prepared to put such pressure on Britain as would give Dr Mossadegh the whole loaf. It was pointed out to him by Mr Harriman that he was only adding grist to the Soviet mill, represented by the Persian Tudeh Party; it was reported by Mr Harriman's oil advisor, Mr Walter Levy, that Persia did not hold a monopoly of world oil and would lose far more than she gained by making life impossible for her British specialists.

Dr Mossadegh throughout behaved as if he constituted a powder barrel or a bomb. If pushed too far he might explode and ruin the West – perhaps the world – in the Soviet holocaust which this might bring about. The Persian frame of mind seemed to be that of people humiliated too long by a foreign domination and therefore not to be talked out of the shining goal of liberty and independence by larger considerations of world stability and prosperity or peace. Persia behaved like a child that had been cheated too often out of what it had set its heart on by appeals to extraneous and irrelevant issues; it might be that stubborn nationalism would lead to economic ruin and consequent collapse and disappearance into the gaping jaws of the USSR – that must be for the West to worry about. Persia had no choice but to seek its liberty from an intolerable yoke.

Dr Mossadegh in effect warned Western statesmen not to irritate him beyond endurance; he exploited Persia's strategic position to the fullest, and drove British and American statesmen to despair by his mixture of charm and refinement with blind obstinacy and exasperating nationalism. On his way back to Tehran he was greeted in Egypt as a conquering hero, as a champion of the Muslim world against the old imperialist oppressor, although he was coming home with empty hands. The British experts withdrew from Abadan. The oil flowed uselessly and was wasted.

Mr Churchill and other Conservative leaders duly denounced the Labour government for ignominious withdrawal, damaging alike to the pride and the standard of living of Great Britain. The Tudeh Party, despite occasional clashes with the Nationalists, appeared, as might be expected, far from displeased with these developments. There were demonstrations of hysterical gratitude to the Persian statesman who brought about the disappearance of the hated alien invader. Persia was free, but in a state of economic chaos, and far poorer than before.

In this condition the year ended. Meanwhile the neighbouring Iraqis saw no reason why they too should not obtain concessions from the Iraq Petroleum Company, and this time the oil company hastened to comply. Iraqi directors were created, the royalties of the Iraqi state greatly raised; King Ibn Saud made demands upon the US Aranco Company, which holds monopolies in Southern Arabia; the sultans of the Persian Gulf in their turn extracted higher rates from their concessionaires. The Arab world was plainly beginning to assert itself. Syria and Israel had a prolonged clash over the Huleh concession, and both complained to the Security Council, which on the whole spoke more severely to Israel than to the Syrians, although it upbraided both, and instructed its Conciliating Commission to patch things up; this it failed to do, but after a time the quarrel appeared to expire from natural causes.

Nationalism, partly stimulated by the discontented embryonic middle class, led to violence elsewhere. After the assassination of a Lebanese statesman in Jordan, the King of Jordan, Abdullah, was murdered as he was entering a mosque in the Arab section of Jerusalem. This was plainly stimulated by the opponents of his traditionally pro-British policies, and his relatively moderate and tolerant dealings with even so hated a foe as Israel. His murderers were punished, but the son who succeeded him was clearly less good-humoured and judicious than his father.

Meanwhile national sentiment in North Africa had succeeded, under British auspices, in creating the new federated Kingdom of Libya, consisting of three provinces governed by the Emir of the Senussi, King Ibn Idris. Egypt, which had long smouldered with violent anti-British hatred, finally, after much rumbling towards the end of 1950, denounced the 1936 treaty upon which the presence of British troops guarding the Suez Canal, and the Anglo-Egyptian government of the Sudan (established in 1899), rested, and, inspired

by the example of Dr Mossadegh's successful intransigence, and perhaps by the manner in which the state of Israel had come into being in the teeth of almost universal opposition, and refusing to listen to British arguments, provoked an incident by detaining and searching a British ship in the Suez Canal, and, amid rising popular fury directly against all foreigners, attempted to seize control of the British military installations in Suez.

This offensive was arrested by force and led to some bloodshed. Nevertheless, the Egyptian resistance did not possess the stamina of the Persian; and towards the end of the year visibly began to crumble. Apart from a neutral Israel, where the mid-year elections restored the anti-Soviet Labour premier, Mr Ben-Gurion, to power, Turkey was the only Near Eastern power upon which the Western nations seemed able to rely in the Eastern Mediterranean. A scheme for centralised Middle East defence was devised, to be shared by the Western powers – the US, Britain, France and Turkey – and a place of equality in it was offered to Egypt, which was invited to hand over the defence of Suez to this federated body rather than Britain alone. Iraq and Syria seemed mildly to favour such a bulwark against the USSR, but Egypt sharply and haughtily refused, and there was talk of establishing its headquarters in Cyprus.

Violent nationalism and defiance of the old imperialist masters was a safety valve which no Middle Eastern government, except in the very primitive states such as Yemen or Saudi Arabia, could afford to dispense with; but the social and economic causes that created the tensions which exploded in this manner were clearly not to be cured by mere displays of national pride and independence, and it became increasingly clear as the year developed that unless some opportunity for effective social and economic development satisfying the ambitions of the frustrated *tiers état* class could be provided to fill the vacuum created by the collapse of the old forms of imperialism and the decay of the feudalism with which it had lived in a ramshackle and disreputable alliance, the Marxist prophets would sooner or later turn out to be right, and a social revolution directed against the West, and of political profit to the USSR alone, would transform the Eastern world. Consequently, more and more began to be heard in the West about the necessity of Western aid in the radical transformation of the decrepit little Eastern regimes, in preference to the present hand-to-mouth policy, likely to be punctuated by nationalist outbursts of increasing violence, until the

final eruption which would bury all that is generally progressive in the Middle East under its ruins, as had already happened in the Balkans and parts of the Far East.

In South East Asia, the disturbed condition of 1951 remained unallayed; the French (and Vietnam) forces achieved minor military successes against the Viet-Minh Communist guerrillas in Indochina; these seemed due principally to the fiery temperament and enterprise of General de Lattre de Tassigny, whose death in the course of the year was a serious setback to French military power. In Malaya, assassinations and sporadic bloodshed continued. The new colonial minister, Mr Oliver Lyttelton, visited the scene of action and made a speech promising new and more vigorous policies, and a new governor was appointed to replace his murdered predecessor; but no noticeable *détente* had occurred before the end of the year. Malaya seemed a territory sufficiently divided inwardly, both racially and in its social and economic structure, to justify considerable Communist investment; it continued in that state of simmering disorder which is the normal prescription of the central Soviet strategists for territories where they believe their adversaries to be sufficiently vulnerable, but where, nevertheless, nothing is to be done which might precipitate a major war.

Nepal went through a revolution which, by the side of the more serious events in its neighbourhood, had something of the air of an Offenbach operetta. The king fled to India, the Rana oligarchy which had ruled the kingdom for many years was overthrown; all was patched up in the end; the king returned; the Rana family lost much, but not all, of their power; concessions to the new spirit of the times were made. The kingdom was gradually being 'integrated' into the Indian system but by Western rather than Soviet methods.

Siam went through one of its regular coups d'état, this time an abortive naval rising; the navy was duly liquidated and the status quo under King Phumiphon and Prime Minister Songgram seemed to return without further ado. In Burma, internecine fighting between the government, Communist guerrillas and Karens continued inconclusively. Indonesia was bickering with its Dutch ex-masters over western New Guinea, and further Dutch concessions were expected and duly made. The danger of a sudden Communist flood in South East Asia seemed to have receded, but the general condition of this portion of the world could hardly be called satisfactory, either from its own or from any but the Soviet point of

view. Long-drawn-out and chaotic fighting between factions seldom animated by any clear ideology, and as often as not involved in purely local ambitions and receiving aid from the enemies of its enemies, pursuing aims often deeply antagonistic to their own, frustrated all intelligible long-term policies and merely resulted in a breakdown in those valuable exports which had for so long been a crucial element in the world economy.

By far the most important Far Eastern event, apart from the Korean–Chinese war itself, was the Japanese treaty signed in San Francisco on 8 September against much Soviet resistance. In theory, this treaty, for the drafting and piloting of which Mr Acheson and the Republican leader Mr J. F. Dulles were given full credit, restored its sovereign rights to the Japanese empire. In practice, however, it was made fairly clear in Washington that Japan was expected to follow the American line in, for example, recognising the Nationalist Chinese Government of Formosa, and not that of Peking. There was some resistance to this from London, but it was plain that Japan in fact did fall within the sphere of US influence, and since the US was conspicuously paying the piper, it had by well-established tradition in such cases a claim to call the tune. With China resolutely anti-Western, Mr Nehru's India friendly but politically scrupulously neutral, a little wounded by its failure to be accepted as honest broker by both East and West, and South East Asia by no means secure, Japan was plainly the strongest potential bulwark of anti-Communist influence, if sufficiently aided and encouraged in political ways sympathetic to the West. And this was the policy actively carried out by the US and at any rate passively supported by its European allies. Meanwhile, Communist China had in effect occupied Tibet; the Dalai Lama, who had fled, was permitted to return and was promised local autonomy. In this way, what was virtually the last romantic and mysterious community left on the surface of the earth was finally robbed of its magic by the uncontrollable development of social and economic forces in their harshest and most aggressive form.

In this disturbed state of affairs, it was perhaps natural for such relatively unprotected states as Australia and New Zealand to seek means of security in the event of a new upheaval: and they duly concluded and signed a treaty with the US which stood to the Pacific powers as the Atlantic alliance to those of Western Europe. They remained self-governing sovereign dominions within the British

Commonwealth, but the fact that the UK was not a formal party to the treaty, and had only a consultative role in it, indicated clearly enough the natural primacy which economic and security requirements were not merely making, but were openly recognised as making, as against the older claims of political allegiance or historical sentiment. In short, it was clear that the reorganisation of the world along functional lines – that is, in response to economic and social needs and those of defence – was occurring in the Pacific as clearly and rapidly as in Europe and the Soviet sphere.

As for Europe itself, it went through a troubled but remarkable year. In Britain, the Labour Government began to feel the pangs of inner discontent and outer failure; Mr Gaitskell's spring budget was widely recognised as able, temperate and just, and irritated profoundly only the left wing of the Labour Party, which under Mr Aneurin Bevan revolted over the issue of undue expenditures on armament as against those on social security (although the occasion of the revolt, as often in such cases, was far more trifling than the real issue). Perhaps this rebellion would have been averted if Mr Ernest Bevin had remained alive, for he played a unique role in British politics, as being at once the most powerful leader of the trade unions in Britain – the strong and unyielding guardian of the standards of living of the working class – and a man of strongly patriotic, even nationalistic, temper, with a deep distrust of intellectuals and ideologies, which endeared him equally to the Conservatives (Mr Churchill had called him 'a working-class John Bull') and to the 'sunder' and more cautious members of his own party.

His failure in Palestine and his heavy-handed treatment of Egypt and Persia showed his strong and obstinate nature at its clumsiest and most prejudiced. But his grasp of the general political and economic tendencies of his time was genuine; by his blunt rejection of ambiguous formulae he did more to turn the tide of liberal and left-wing opinion against Soviet policy than any other statesman of his time. His interpretation of General Marshall's celebrated speech of 1947 was crucial in the development of the Marshall Plan – certainly the greatest single factor in turning the Communist tide in Europe in the last five years. Despite his errors of judgement and his vanity, his strength of mind and will and his grasp of fundamentals struck the imagination of the nation. He was not popular with left-wing opinion in Europe; but he was trusted by

Parliament, by Mr Attlee, by the King and by the general public, far beyond the boundaries of his own country.

The death of Mr Bevin certainly weakened the Labour Government politically, and failures to settle the Korean war and Persian crisis increased the lack of public confidence, which the deteriorating economic situation did little to bolster. Steel was duly nationalised against furious Conservative opposition and even minor Labour qualms. The dramatic financial improvement of 1950 gave way to a mounting monetary crisis – not only the dollar gap but the sterling gap too widened to alarming proportions. The financial concessions to Egypt, one of the principal sterling creditors, at a moment when that Kingdom was showing every sign of unfriendliness, was not well received by Parliament or the press. The resignation of Mr Aneurin Bevan and the reorganisation of the government against a background of shortage of labour, coal and other raw materials made the prospect for winter look exceedingly gloomy. Mr Attlee decided to recommend dissolution.

On 25 October the Conservatives were elected by a majority of some seventeen votes, but with the help of Liberal and Independent allies, could command a slightly larger number. It was clear, after the extraordinary manner in which the Labour Government had managed to pilot its legislation despite even smaller and sometimes evanescent majorities, that this strength was sufficient for the normal discharge of the offices of the government; the degree of political responsibility displayed by both parties made Mr Attlee's promise not to indulge in factionalism ring true both to his own supporters and to the victorious Conservatives. It was clear that the country was divided very evenly, since the actual number of votes cast for the Labour Party exceeded that cast for the victorious Conservatives; it was plain that whichever government was in power would be well advised to seek some degree of *de facto* general solidarity, and not impose measures which the moderates in the opposition could genuinely not bring themselves to swallow.

Mr Churchill became Prime Minister for the second time at the age of seventy-seven amid very considerable popular interest in almost every part of the world; he was felt to be, it not necessarily the wisest, yet much the most brilliant and spellbinding public personality, a figure of legendary size upon the world stage. Naturally enough, the British public, long hemmed in by restrictions which some of them attributed to the tendency to puritanism and

passion for social equality on the part of the socialists rather than to the pressure of economic necessity or of national needs, halfexpected a sudden great relaxation of controls, and perhaps a flow of commodities; if not the flowing pre-war cornucopia which even the most sanguine realised not to be feasible, at any rate a gayer, more spacious and more enjoyable life.

Nevertheless, so sharp was the economic crisis which the Conservative Government had inherited that its first measures were still further to restrict civilian goods, to impose sharper controls upon foreign currency, and altogether to give an example of belt-tightening which, some melancholy persons believed, would presently make even the austerities of socialism seem enviable by comparison. Mr Churchill made it clear that his government would not embark on revolutionary measures designed to end the constructive work of his predecessors; he would, indeed, seek to denationalise steel, but would leave the other nationalised industries, for example, coal and railways, unaltered. He would not seek to recognise the Chinese Nationalists in order to give pleasure to the US. And he obviously believed himself in a better position to negotiate with Generalissimo Stalin than his Labour predecessors had shown themselves to be. His government, besides persons enjoying his special confidence, contained a sufficient number of moderate and progressive Conservatives to indicate that no violently retrogressive steps were being contemplated.

Mr R. A. Butler, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, spoke sharply of the imminent perils of bankruptcy; he was obviously to be allowed to do whatever he thought to be required to re-establish the falling financial credit of Great Britain. There was a depressed feeling of a recurrent, undulant river in British financial affairs, by which periods of relative financial recovery seemed doomed to be succeeded by ever deeper slumps, for no means had yet been discovered to stop the swift flow of dollars back to their US source. British exports exceeded pre-war output; no charges of idleness, or even of incurable inefficiency, could be preferred against Britain: the causes of her economic ills lay clearly in her gravely weakened position vis-à-vis the rest of the Western world. And the attempt to find a form of economic life which would enable the country not only to survive but to achieve a measure of stability and even progress in material welfare was by far the greatest single problem before the new administration, and, indeed, before the country at

large. The opposition would doubtless continue to oppose, but national problems, as for so long, clearly transcended those of party, and the prospect of relative unanimity for stringent measures regarded as vital and inescapable seemed likely to be achieved.

Into foreign policy, which was now the province of Mr Eden, Mr Churchill clearly infused a blast of his old Palmerstonian spirit; Mr Morrison's cautious approaches were succeeded by a far sharper tone to the Egyptians; political observers wondered whether a tougher bargaining would occur with Americans. The Labour Government had proceeded under the necessity of avoiding charges of taking up anti-American positions for ideological rather than patriotic reasons; no such suspicion rested upon Mr Churchill or the bulk of the Conservative Party. His own profound pro-American feelings were well enough known; and he was therefore less likely to be inhibited in vigorous defence of the British point of view than some of his Labour predecessors.

The year ended without adequate evidence for or against this hypothesis. It ended in a grey mood for the inhabitants of the British Isles: in unrelieved and increasing lack of material goods, with the memory of the Festival of Britain somewhat dimmed by the approach of the cold winter months, with some anxiety about the King's health, with the Empire everywhere harassed by discontented kingdoms which it had helped to independence, and which now appeared to repay this help with what to the British sometimes seemed mounting ingratitude. Yet the general mood was calm and strong. Outside observers dilated upon Britain's troubles and displayed sympathy or contentment in accordance with their sentiments; within the island there were no visible signs of conscious decline. Morale – the feeling of inner confidence – was still firmer, and nerves stronger than in the economically far more prosperous lands to the south and the east of her.

In France, too, there had been elections in June, which, owing to the complicated new electoral system, had produced what was commonly called the Hexagon – about one hundred deputies for each of the major blocs of opinion: the Communists, the Socialists, the Radicals and their allies, the Liberal Catholics, the Conservatives and the Gaullists. Given that the Gaullists and the Communists were not, at any rate immediately, prepared to enter into any genuine coalition, this left a group somewhat right of centre in effective charge, and resembled the structure of the Third Republic to a

degree which astonished those who believed that France had gone through a transformation which had altered the basic structure of her life. Such persons had been mistaken.

The Communists were still almost as strong as before. They lost, indeed, about seven per cent of the vote, and far more in terms of seats in the Chamber, owing to the electoral law which made it possible for local alliances between parties to capture all the seats for a given district. Nevertheless, there was no increase in their strength. They were clearly being 'contained', and, if anything, were losing rather than gaining. The Gaullists made a great comeback at the expense of the Catholic MRP, and other right and centre parties, but again were not strong enough to be able to gain control. Nor had General de Gaulle, for all the fears entertained about him, done anything to suggest that he wished to seize dictatorial power. His party seemed a motley collection of genuine men of the Resistance, patriots of various colours, and a great many straightforwardly reactionary elements as well – old Vichy politicians and generals, as well as monarchists and bigoted right-wing figures of many brands.

The Socialists, as in most European countries, were in the embarrassing position of having to estimate how much support they could give to the centre parties to avoid the dangers of Communism and Gaullism without compromising too many of their own principles and becoming mere appendages to what would seem to be a ruling group of conservative-liberal texture. The government was headed now by M. Pleven, now by M. Queuille, with M. Schuman as the apparently irreplaceable Foreign Minister; this in effect represented various shades of independent conservative to radical opinion – such governments, in fact, as had ruled France not too incompetently during large portions of the last three-quarters of a century.

The French Empire, or, as it was now called, Union, had its own troubles. The war in Indochina was a great drain upon its resources; Morocco was in a ferment and demanded independence; pan-Arab nationalism had stirred up Tunis. The latter the French tried to put down with a firm hand, which appeared at any rate temporarily to be succeeding. In Syria, it was regaining positions which it had been forced to lose by the Anglo-American policy of the last years of the war, by dint of supplying armament and other economic aid to Syria and to Lebanon. Indeed, those who professed to be unable to understand Syrian reluctance to accept economic aid from the US

professed to see in this the influence of French intrigue. On the Jerusalem issue, the French fairly consistently backed the Vatican, which remained adamant in its nationalisation plan for Jerusalem, rejected equally by Arabs and Jews, but more vehemently, perhaps, by the Jordanian Arabs. But these were not the major French problems in the field of foreign affairs.

The nightmare which brooded over all Frenchmen was still that of the possibility of a rearmed Germany. Temperamentally, M. Schuman and the German Chancellor, Herr Adenauer, plainly had much in common. Both were moderate Catholics, anxious to preserve a flexible conservative structure and to avoid extremes. But the spectre of German rearmament, despite the protest against it of the German Socialist leader Herr Schumacher (and the lack of any obvious military zeal on the part of the youth of Western Germany), was a source of genuine alarm both to the Frenchmen and to other Europeans, and not least to the USSR. The Plevan plan for a European army entailed integration of German units into it, and this seemed to the French the safest way of neutralising the possibility of the revival of German militarism. It was reported that disagreements about this had occurred between the French and those American strategic planners who, aiming at the swiftest and largest-scale possible Western German rearmament, maintained that without this Western defences would be for ever insufficient, and regarded all political objections as irrelevant to this simple and inescapable issue. The year ended without a final decision on this point, but the thought that, unlike France herself in the nineteenth century, Germany had not yet been reduced by her defeats to a frame of mind where she would never psychologically once again constitute a military menace to Europe was one of the few beliefs which united Frenchmen of almost all shades of opinion.

This thought was plainly at the back of French resistance to German claims in the Saar; it was part of the attraction of the Schuman plan which broke the German monopoly of the Ruhr. It stirred uneasily in the minds of many Western Europeans who watched with mingled admiration and uneasiness the prodigious German effort of reconstruction after the ravages of war. German energy, skill and appetite for life was clearly greater than that of any other European nation, and, if she rearmed, her thoughts might easily and, as it were, by the logic of events, turn once again to the ancient dream of European domination which her numbers,

economic strength and intellectual capacity had seemed to others besides herself to make inevitable

It was clear that this fear was no less deeply embedded in the thinking of the Russians, to whom the Germans had traditionally always been the most feared and admired of nations, and, according to some competent observers, were a greater source of dread than atomic bombs. Fear of Germany was one of the factors strongest, perhaps, in promoting loyalty to the Soviet regime on the part of satellite populations which remembered Hitler and his predecessors. Indeed, the whole of the 'containment' policy of the Western allies vis-à-vis the USSR was a matter of exceedingly delicate balance, which had to be preserved to a sufficient degree of strength to discourage further Soviet penetration, and yet not so great as to provoke a terrified and over-violent reaction likely to lead to general war.

In this complex and precarious calculation, which was the heart of the Cold War in Europe, the behaviour of Germany was crucial. Every tremor provoked reactions of one kind or another on both sides; and although both the Germanies spoke of the need for union, and President Heuss and Dr Adenauer were doubtless just as sincere in their professions on the subject as Herr Pieck and Herr Grotewohl in Soviet Germany – each rejecting the others' suggestion about the possibility of joint elections as a mere trick of the imperialist warmongers or Soviet subverters respectively – yet the prospect of a unified Germany was not one which either side in the Cold War contemplated with complete equanimity, since it might add much too great an accession in weight to one or the other of the two scales in the balance of power, which still, despite the Korean war, was somehow being preserved in Europe, almost against the expectations of the powers themselves. Of this precious balance divided Germany was herself the most vivid example.

Politically, no great changes in Germany were noticeable compared to those of the previous year. In German minds all guilt about German misdeeds seemed finally to have disappeared, at any rate in the West; neo-Nazis and particularly the notorious General Remer, who had foiled the anti-Hitler putsch in 1944, had raised their heads openly and blatantly. The US High Commissioner Mr McCloy was forced to comment upon his disappointment that evil elements were still so rampant among the Germans; others, notably his assistant Mr Bittenwieser, echoed the sentiment sharply. The

Roman Church might indeed exercise a certain restraining influence, but so far as true German democracy was concerned, its toleration of subversive elements seemed to some observers to bear an uncomfortably close resemblance to the very similar behaviour of the Weimar Republic in its first years.

Nevertheless, it was thought in the West, resignedly but firmly, that abnormal situations cannot be carried on for too long. Against Russian protests, Western Germany was assisted to rearm, and the state of war with Germany was formally ended by the US, by Britain and by most of the other Western allies in the course of the year.

The situation in Italy was somewhat different. There too, the Demo-Christian Party and its allies continued to govern under the highly capable Signor de Gasperi. The Communist Party did not seem to lose in strength, but neither did it gain. The secession from it of Cucchi and Magnani, two prominent Emilian Communists who protested against excessive subservience to the interests of Moscow, raised hopes that this might cause a genuine split among the Italian Communists. But by the end of the year it had not weakened the Italian Communists seriously. They remain a large and dangerous party, capable of exploiting any suitable opportunity for the seizure of power. If no such opportunity has hitherto occurred, this is largely due to the political skill of the present government and the powerful economic aid of the US.

At the other end of the scale neo-Fascism was by no means dead. A journal with the title *Popolo Italia*, reminiscent of Mussolini's old daily Milanese journal – this time a weekly and issued in Rome – openly advocated the policies of the Italian Social Movement, a party apparently favourable to a return to pure Mussolinian Fascism. Such movements are naturally stimulated by the still uncured Italian problems of the mass unemployment of unskilled workers and of landless peasants, especially damaged this year by the great floods which rendered many persons homeless.

On the other side may be set the genuine effort on the part of the de Gasperi Government to institute agrarian reform among the great fallow estates of the southern provinces of Apulia and Calabria. The settlement of some tens of thousands of peasants upon these mismanaged *latifundia* is the very measure failure to promote which in the Germany of 1931 and 1932 was one of the causes of the downfall of Dr Brüning's government (which in some

respects closely resembled the Demo-Christians of today) and so paved the way to the great debacle.

Italian Socialists managed to achieve some degree of union when the followers of Saragat, the right-wing leader, agreed to fuse with the followers of Messrs Romita and Silone. Mr Saragat resigned from the government, and Messrs Romita and Silone agreed not to protest against American aid. But this did not seem to have made an important difference to the Italian political scene. Don Sturzo of the old Catholic Popular movement continued to be an object of veneration, but remained ineffective.

So long as the danger of major war exists it is perhaps natural for large sections of opinion to suppose that they can escape it by sitting still and isolating themselves from either of the two great contenders; nevertheless, 'neutralism' was not as powerful in 1951 as in the exasperated years immediately following the war. The USSR had itself done a great deal to discourage, frighten and embitter those who wished to represent it as, at any rate, no more wicked than the US; and US aid, although often tactlessly imposed, and leading to much mutual antipathy and friction, has conspicuously not had that enslaving effect which its opponents had always prophesied that it would have. Coca-Cola culture has not, in fact, begun visibly to corrupt the citadels of the European spirit. The Western world seemed to be a more coherent and inwardly less brittle entity than it was a year ago; a Third Force, although in theory dead and forgotten, in fact ruled Western Europe.

Italy, France, Britain, Belgium (after a constitutional crisis whereby King Baudouin peacefully took over from his father Leopold, whose behaviour during the war made him unacceptable to too many of his subjects), Holland were ruled by governments of the centre or right of centre; Scandinavia by socialists; yet the gap between these governments, in practice – certainly as far as foreign policy and even domestic policy are concerned – was by no means unbridgeable; certainly much smaller than that which divided them from Communism and the Peoples' Democracies on the one hand and, on the other, from such Fascism as still exists in Spain or Portugal and Argentina.

The East–West division penetrates all institutions. The two Labor Internationals – the old International Federation of Trade Unions and the new International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, representing Communist and anti-Communist influence

respectively – divided the workers of the world. The lines were very clearly drawn. There was an atmosphere of grim stalemate and a desire to contain and localise conflicts; and this was symptomatic not only of the Western powers, but of the USSR too. Certainly there was reason to think that Stalin viewed the prospect of a general war with as much horror as his opponents, and when so dangerous a situation as that in Persia erupted suddenly, Russian diplomacy touched it in a manner at least as gingerly as that displayed by the representatives of the West.

As for the outskirts of the two great systems, in Greece there was a swing to the right under Field Marshal Papagos, which did not, however, fundamentally alter the political complexion of the country. General Franco in Spain found himself in better favour than for many years in the past. The US had decided to recognise him and to send a military mission to discuss his share in European defence. Britain, after much heart-searching and open reluctance, fell into line with an equally troubled France, and ambassadors from these countries too duly appeared in Madrid.

In Portugal, the President, General Carmona, died and was succeeded by General Lopez. Dr Salazar continued his austere and unruffled reign. In Ireland, Mr de Valera returned to power. Sweden continued with her policy of cautious neutrality and permitted the first post-war International Fascist Congress to take place on her soil. In Latin America, Communism was growing stronger in Guatemala. The usual number of minor political coups and disturbances occurred. The concept of ‘justicialism’ was proclaimed by General Perón as a specific Argentinian contribution to the stock of valuable political ideas: thereby the interests of all the classes were reconciled in terms of his own peculiar brand of neo-Fascism. The great independent newspaper of Buenos Aires, *La Prensa*, was suppressed, and its editor sought refuge in the US.

In Pakistan, the Premier, Liaqat Ali, the most respected and the strongest Muslim politician in India after the late founder of the state, Mr Jinnah, was assassinated; a Communist or semi-Communist plot was suspected in conjunction with mutinous members of the Pakistani General Staff. But no consequences seemed to flow from this event, nor from the skirmishing along the Afghani frontier which continued unabated throughout the war. In India, Mr Nehru continued his undisputed sway; he was challenged by various politicians all of whom, in one fashion or another,

claimed the mantle of the late Mr Ghandi, but he routed all opposition easily, and showed himself one of the most remarkable statesmen of the free world in our time.

In Africa, much of interest occurred. The progressive emancipation of the natives of that great continent under British tutelage was rapidly progressing for all to see. Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone adopted new constitutions, increasing the element of native self-government; the Gold Coast was governed by its first, almost entirely elected, legislature this year – a bold experiment in the granting of political liberties to a people commonly regarded as still backward, under the leadership of a Communist sympathiser, Dr Nkrumah, whose reported behaviour would, thus far, have satisfied the most exacting liberal constitutionalist.

A suggestion that northern and eastern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should be established as a new dominion under the title of ‘Central Africa’ was widely canvassed. This naturally caused grave misgivings to the nationalist and politically reactionary government of South Africa, with its policy of rigid native segregation, its measures directed to the depriving of its coloured population of such rights to direct voting as they had already acquired, and its general belief in repression as the only method of preserving white, and more particularly Boer, supremacy. Disorders both among the negro and the Indian populations of the Union were dealt with summarily by the government, which rejected all the claims of the United Nations to look into, let alone supervise, its relationships to its coloured or Indian subjects. Dr Malan, the Premier, protested to the British government against the admission of such ‘non-white’ dominions as India, Pakistan and Ceylon into its midst, saying that it regarded itself as a member of a club – the British Commonwealth – with a right of veto of the admission to it of what it regarded as highly unsuitable new members. In due course, these policies produced a reaction in the form of a movement named the Veterans Torch Commando, led by the Premier’s namesake, Mr A. G. Malan, which evidently stood for a wider degree of civil liberties than that permitted by the party in power.

As for the USSR itself, its attitudes were clear enough for all to see. In foreign policy, it proclaimed to the outside world its advocacy of peace; spoke of the possibility of peaceful coexistence with the West; singled out the US as the greatest enemy of mankind; went back to President Wilson to discover the roots of this evil, and was

duly reproved with severity by Mr Dean Acheson, who alluded to several centuries of aggressive foreign policy on the part of Russian governments.

Soviet spokesmen denounced Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia in terms of greater violence than ever before, but took no specific action against him; declared that it had disarmed on a greater scale than the West, and so far from having aggressive intentions, itself feared invasion. They spoke of the encirclement of the USSR, and regarded the Japanese treaty as forging yet another link in this dangerous process. At San Francisco the USSR suffered a heavy, but scarcely unexpected, defeat. There was speculation about its motive for attending a meeting so openly arrayed against its wishes.

The USSR confirmed its support of nationalist movements in the Middle East in accordance with the Marxist tradition whereby, against foreign yokes, local nationalism is to be supported – until it is superseded by social revolution. It claimed one and a half billion signatures to the newest appeal for peace composed in Berlin; accused Britain of violating the Anglo–Soviet treaty of 1942, and the French of violating the corresponding Franco–Soviet treaty. It denounced Norway and Turkey for accepting NATO aid, and offered, as an alternative to the Atlantic Treaty, a Great Power Directorate, somewhat along the lines which Mr Roosevelt and Mr Churchill were accused of contemplating in 1944, and on which the late Mr Neville Chamberlain was thought in the late 1930s to have set his heart as an alternative to collective security provided by the League of Nations. It denounced the production of atomic weapons and demanded the outlawing of these without granting the rights of supervision over its own installations to foreign powers, and continued to bicker on this topic more, it was clear, for propaganda purposes than with any serious intention of limiting warfare. It admitted exploding at least one atomic bomb of its own, and there were confused rumours of Western scientists who had gone to the USSR to work on atomic weapons for the Soviet government.

There was in this connection puzzled and worried talk about the disappearance of two members of the British Foreign Office, Mr Maclean and Mr Burgess, who left for France and were not seen again, and whose alleged views made it possible to think that they had also tried to achieve private contact with Soviet representatives, although there seemed to be no scintilla of concrete evidence as to where they had gone or what they had done. The fact that they were

wholly British by birth and descent did something to offset the general impression that it was aliens and refugees who formed the bulk of pro-Soviet traitors and informers in the countries of the West. In the US, a Mr and Mrs Rosenberg were condemned to death in the course of the year for giving information to Soviet agents. They were still awaiting execution when the year came to a close. Several other persons were also arrested and imprisoned in this connection.

As for internal Soviet policy, little concrete evidence could, of course, be obtained by outside observers, but it appeared that the policy of creating quasi-industrial settlements of peasants (agrocities) had not made adequate progress. The reasons for initialiating this scheme were considered to be not merely economic, but political, since peasants were notoriously the least controllable and politically most non-penetrable elements in any country, and had shown an uncomfortable degree of independence and even disloyalty to the Soviet government during the late war. The purge of the USSR Communist Party appeared to be nearly complete. Fifteen of the sixteen constituent 'republics' having by now held their own party congresses, the situation seemed ripe for the Congress of the All-Union Communist Party – the nineteenth, which was vastly overdue. Mr Beria announced great increases in industrial output; Mr Stalin reached the age of seventy-three on 21 December, and ten days later, the last day of the year, Mr Maxim Litvinov died; with him the memory of the slightly more 'European' policy on the part of the USSR seemed finally to die too.

Pravda published an article by Mr Herbert Morrison after being publicly accused of never providing its readers with accurate accounts of the views of foreign statesmen, and the article was duly attacked, denounced and 'refuted' by the entire Soviet press and media within the next few days. Nothing was heard of the Cominform. The only European sovereign state outside the Iron Curtain where Communists obtained increased representation in the course of the year appeared to be the free republic of San Marino.

Meanwhile, General Chang had grown to be something like a Republican hero. The vagaries of feeling about China have zig-zagged more precipitously than any other similar attitude in the US. At the beginning of the war the Chinese were classified in a series of mutually contradictory categories as at once a very large and populous country, the largest nation in the world, with a long history

and vast wisdom, and a feeble, weak political entity, deserving of all the help which the American people could give it; as at the same time a nation of cunning orientals and as a people almost Christian and touched with grace; tortured and exploited by the sub-human Japanese; as at once fastidious and inheritors of an exquisitely beautiful civilisation, and as illiterate peasants needing many schoolteachers from the US to teach them the rudiments of the ultimate. There was ground for all these views, but they were held in a curious amalgam, a curious and differentiated amalgam often by the same persons, usually out of the influence of Sinophile missionaries.

The combination of Madam Chiang's unsuccessful tour of the US towards the end of the war, the spreading of the stories of corruption and cowardice on the part of Chiang's regime, and a certain amount of left-wing propaganda, both innocent and deliberate, undermined this ideal, and such pro-Chinese sentiment as was effective in the US in the first four years seemed mainly to extend towards the New China of farmers and town-planners, which, it was hoped, was emerging from the ruin of war.

The Communist advance destroyed this hope and automatically raised the stock of the defeated General Chiang, who, whatever his faults, was at any rate a reliable anti-Communist personality. Nevertheless, it was clear that the pro- and anti-Chiang factions, the attacks of the Old Chins lobby, which was held to have deceived Congress and subverted the administration, and the activities of the New China lobby, which was engaged in saying they were fundamentally concerned with internal issues in the US – for example, with the battle between the administration and its opponents, as such.

With a presidential year looming, the alignments of various candidates for the great office began to be discernible and civil liberty was one of the issues involved. On the Republican side the most likely candidate of the party-line Republicans was clearly Senator Taft, who, after considerable oscillation in this matter, appeared finally to accept Senator McCarthy as a political ally and to ally himself with him, which appeared to gravely distress some of his more respectable followers. The Progressive wing of the Republican Party, who had originally followed Mr Willkie and then found to them a somewhat disappointing candidate in Mr Stassen, finally prevailed upon General Eisenhower to allow himself to be

drafted by them. They were led by Senators Lodge and Duff, and their calculation appeared to be that a purely Republican figure was unlikely to secure the election, inasmuch as statistically it seemed that the Republicans commanded a minority of votes in the country, but that a nationally known and trusted figure of proven worth both in war and in peace, with the unique aura of General Eisenhower, might attract the floating vote on which victory depended.

Mr Truman declined to reveal whether or not he intended to offer his candidature again. There were rumours that he wished to wrap his mantle round the shoulder of the liberal Governor of Illinois, Mr Adlai Stevenson, whose personal integrity and record of good government would appeal to many an undecided voter as well as the liberal sections of the Democratic Party and its intelligentsia. Senator Kefauver, who had conducted the much publicised inquiry into racketeering in the US, announced his candidature as an Independent Democrat. There were rumours that Senator Russell would do the same as the leader of the solid and conservative South. The name of General MacArthur was vaguely bruited as a possibility. Governor Dewey made it clear he would not himself be a candidate again and offered his support to General Eisenhower.

There was much speculation about whether the Republicans, exasperated by twenty years out of office, could bring themselves to accept a candidate who, while his chances of victory might be greater than that of a regular party leader, yet might display a degree of independence which the Republican machine could hardly view with satisfaction. And this seemed to be the position of General Eisenhower, who had revealed no clear political views at any stage of his career.

Towards the end of the year it did not seem clear that General Eisenhower would in fact be drafted by the Republicans, and Senator Taft's chance of being the candidate looked moderately bright. If Mr William Randolph Hearst had lived through the year there is no doubt that his powerful press empire would have offered such support to Senator McCarthy and his friends as would have made a difference one way or the other to the inner politics of the Republican Party; but in the course of the year that prodigious leader passed away, and this offered one of the rare occasions on which the natural charity and courtesy of obituary writers yielded to their inability to repress that moral censure which Mr Hearst, to a greater degree perhaps than Col. McCormick, excited in high-minded and

scrupulous persons. The Governor of the State of California, Mr Warren, a cleverly liberal Republican, also emerged as a possible Republican candidate.

The year ended inconclusively, with the issues of foreign policy dominating over the struggle between the political parties in the US; with the Far East still in flames, the Middle East in a condition of mounting upheaval; with fear of general war on the whole abated, but the general outlook, particularly in view of Britain's semi-bankrupt economic position, far from bright. The news of the death of Henri Pétain, of Fritz Thyssen, who had supported Hitler, and of former Crown Prince Wilhelm von Hohenzollern ('Little Willie') served to comfort those who looked back upon the past as to a brighter and securer day with the reflection that the confusions and moral delinquencies and great blunders of that time seemed to itself no less dark and fatal than the present to its inhabitants.

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